An illocutionary account of reportative evidentials in imperatives by AnderBois, Scott
Proceedings of SALT 27: 459–479, 2017
An illocutionary account of reportative evidentials in
imperatives*
Scott AnderBois
Brown University
Abstract This paper provides a detailed analysis of reportative evidentials in
imperative sentences, drawing on original fieldwork in Tagalog and Yucatec Maya.
Previous literature presents two distinct views of such sentences, which we dub
‘imperative-by-proxy’ and ‘neutral report’ views. Based on a range of data across
different sorts of imperatives uses in different sorts of contexts, we argue for a
version of the ‘imperative-by-proxy’ theory and proposal a formal analysis with
theory of illocutionary updates.
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1 Introduction
Evidentials are often described as functional morphemes that encode the speaker’s
information source for the claim they are making. While this description is roughly
appropriate for evidentials in declarative sentences, evidentials also occur in other
sentence types in some, but not all, languages. Where possible, it is often the case
that only a proper subset of evidentials is possible, as Aikhenvald (2004: pp. 242-9)
describes in some length for interrogative sentences. Despite their more restricted use
compared to declaratives, the meaning/use of evidentials in interrogatives has been
quite informative about the nature of evidentials and the structure of illocutionary
updates more generally (e.g. Murray (2010, 2011, 2014), Lim (2010)).
Beyond interrogatives, however, interactions between non-declarative sentences
and evidentials remain largely unexplored. In particular, imperatives in a number of
unrelated languages allow for reportative evidentials, as in (1) from Tagalog.1
* Thanks to Rosa Isela Canche Cen, Miguel Oscar Chan Dzul, Margarita Hau Hau, Norma Patri-
cia Kuyoc Kuyoc, Irma Yolanda Pomol Cahum, and Luis Petul for Yucatec Maya judgments and
feedback! Thanks to Henrison Hsieh, Jenny Tan, and Amber Teng for their Tagalog judgments and
feedback. Thanks also to Polly Jacobson, Sarah Murray, Kyle Rawlins, Vesela Simeonova, 6 anony-
mous SALT 27 reviewers, and audiences at SAIL 2017, SALT 2017, and Brown’s LingLangLunch
for helpful comments.
1 The following abbreviations are used for glosses: DEF: definite article, DIR: direct case, IMP: imper-
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(1) Kumuha
take.AGT.TRIG
ka
you.DIR
daw
REP
ng
INDIR
tinapay.
bread
‘Take some bread (she says/they say)!’ Tagalog
Previous literature has noted that such sentences are possible in several languages
and made some informal claims about the interpretation of imperative sentences with
reportative evidentials (henceforth, IMPREP). Even at this relatively informal level,
however, two clearly distinct views exist about the meaning of such sentences. On
the one hand, Aikhenvald (2010: p. 138) describes IMPREP thusly: ‘not just ‘hearsay’
— it implies a command to do something on someone else’s order’, what I will
call IMPERATIVE BY PROXY. On the other hand, Schwager (2010: p. 8) describes
IMPREP as ‘not an imperative on behalf of a third party, but rather an entirely neutral
report of an imperative’ (see Thomas (2014), Korotkova (2015), Korotkova (2016)
for related views), what I will call a NEUTRAL REPORT view. Fleshing these two
views, then, we can think of the IMPERATIVE BY PROXY view as holding that
IMPREP contribute the same primary meanings/updates as other imperatives, whereas
the NEUTRAL REPORT holds that they contribute informational updates whose
content is a report or quote whose contents are imperative-like.
Beyond the general sparsity of data on IMPREP, two particular aspects of previous
literature make it hard to adjudicate between these two views. First, as is plain
from Aikhenvald (2010)’s quote above, the literature on IMPREP typically focuses
exclusively on command-like uses, ignoring the wide range of other functions served
by imperative sentences generally (e.g. wishes, advice, requests). Second, previous
literature typically provides example sentences in isolation, without the surrounding
discourse contexts in which they may occur.
In this paper, I examine IMPREP in two unrelated languages – Yucatec Maya
and Tagalog – and argue for a version of the IMPERATIVE BY PROXY view based
on data from context-relative felicity judgments. As has been argued for certain
readings of interrogatives with reportatives, I argue that an illocutionary account
of IMPREP is needed. Specifically, I develop an account within a Farkas & Bruce
(2010)-style scoreboard semantics, building on AnderBois (2014)’s account of
reportatives in declarative sentences. The rest of the paper is structured as follows.
§2 reviews properties of evidentials with an eye towards distinguishing them from
related constructions (e.g. quotatives), some of which interact differently with
fective aspect, IMPER: imperative, INDIR: indirect case, MIR: mirative, NEG: negation, NEG.CL:
negative/extrafocal clitic, OBL: oblique case, PFV: perfective aspect, PL: plural, PREP: preposition,
PRES: presentative, PROG: progressive aspect, REL: relational noun suffix, SUBJ: subjunctive mood,
TOP: topic marker, For agreement morphology in YM, I follow the terminological tradition among
Mayanists, referring to Set A (≈ Ergative/Nominative) and Set B (≈ Absolutive/Accusative) markers,
e.g. A3 = 3rd person Ergative/Nominative. B3 is phonologically null and therefore left unglossed.
All examples are elicited unless otherwise noted.
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imperatives; §3 examines the illocutionary effects of IMPREP in discourse including
the range of responses they elicit; §4 looks at two different types of ‘softening’
claimed to happen in IMPREP; §5 develops an illocutionary analysis of IMPREP in
a scoreboard semantics; §6 concludes including discussing implications for the
typology of evidentials.
2 Reportatives defined
Before proceeding, I first provide brief background on the two languages examined
here, including the properties of the clitic particle categories to which the reportative
markers in the two languages belong. Yucatec Maya (YM) is one of 30 languages in
the Mayan family, spoken by ≈759,000 people (2005 census) across the Mexican
states of Campeche, Quintana Roo, and Yucatán (INEGI (2009)). Tagalog is an
Austronesian language of the Phillippines spoken as the first language of an estimated
28 million speakers. Both languages have verb-initial basic word order with surface
word order driven largely by discourse-related factors including preverbal topic and
focus constructions.
Unlike many of the languages where evidentials have been investigated in the
most detail, neither YM nor Tagalog are languages with inflectional paradigms of
evidentials. Rather, the Tagalog reportative daw (or its variant raw) is a member of a
set of 18 second-position clitics conveying a variety of different modal, information,
structural, and other ‘discourse-related’ meanings (see Schachter & Otanes (1972:
pp. 411-435) for comprehensive description). YM similarly lacks a paradigm of
evidentials, but its reportative, bin, is a member of a small set of clitics whose linear
position is preferentially second position, but quite flexible. Other members of this
class, whose formal properties are described in a bit more detail by AnderBois (ms)
include mirative bakáan, polar question wáa(j), frustrative lo’obal, and túun ‘then’.
Despite the clear difference in the languages’ evidential systems more gener-
ally, YM bin and Tagalog daw nonetheless share several core properties in their
use in declarative sentences that we take to distinguish them from other second-
hand/quotational constructions across languages (i.e. from things other than reporta-
tive evidentials). First, bin or daw in simple declaratives indicates the information
source the speaker has for their claim. In contrast, a morpheme like Kallaalisuut
=guuq not only has such uses but also has directive uses even in declarative sentences
as in (2) from Bittner (2014: p. 144).
(2) Su-si-nngit-la-nga=guuq
what-get-not-DECL-1sg=REP
‘Tell [her], I didn’t buy anything.’ Kalaallisut
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Second, although the identity of the reporter may be clear in context, as in (3a),
reportatives like daw and bin do not allow for the reporter to be overtly expressed in
any way. For example, attempts to make this apparently anaphoric link explicit as a
pronoun or proper name, (3b), or via agreement, (3c) are ungrammatical. Finally, in
(3d), we see for YM that the desire to make explicit the reporter’s identity does not
license a clausal topic, even though nothing rules out the reporter being coreferential
with an independently licensed clausal topic.
(3) Scenario: I was talking to my friend Luis earlier about the Xtáabay (a
mythical woman who seduces and attacks drunk men in the jungle) and now
tell you:
a. Chowak
long
bin
REP
u
A3
tso’ots-el
hair-REL
u
A3
pool
head
le
DEF
ixtáabay=o’.
Xtáabay=DISTAL
‘I was told (by Luis) that the Xtáabay’s hair is long.’ Yucatec Maya
b. * Chowak
long
bin
REP
{leti’/Luis}
him/Luis
u
A3
tso’ots-el
hair-REL
u
A3
pool
head
le
DEF
ixtáabay=o’.
Xtáabay=DISTAL
Intended *‘I was told by {him/Luis} that the Xtáabay’s hair is long.’
c. * Chowak
long
u
A3
bin
REP
u
A3
tso’ots-el
hair-REL
u
A3
pool
head
le
DEF
ixtáabay=o’.
Xtáabay=DISTAL
Intended *‘I was told by him/her that the Xtáabay’s hair is long.’
d. * Luis=e’
Luis=TOP
chowak
long
bin
REP
u
A3
tso’ots-el
hair-REL
u
A3
pool
head
le
DEF
ixtáabay=o’.
Xtáabay=DISTAL
Intended *‘As for Luis, I was told by him that the Xtáabay’s hair is
long.’
This contrasts, for example, with another construction in YM, what Lucy (1993)
calls the QUOTATIVE, which inflects with absolutive agreement for the original
source (e.g. k(ij) ‘he says/said’, keen ‘I say/said’) and optionally for the recipient of
the original quote.2
(4) Xeen
go.IMPER
- kij
QUOT.3SG
(tech).
DAT.2SG
‘ “Go”, he said/says (to you)’ Yucatec Maya
In addition to the use with an apparently anaphoric reporter in (3a), reportatives
can also be used in cases with indefinite-like (or perhaps generic-like) reporters, as in
(5). While some accounts regard the reporter as an implicit argument, note that this
2 Ceong (2016) similarly claims that the Korean ‘reportative’ -y/-tay inflect for person and therefore
would not be considered within the scope of the present inquiry. Ceong (2016) briefly discussed
imperatives with this marker, but beyond establishing their grammaticallity, more work is needed to
understand how they are interpreted.
462
An illocutionary account of reportative evidentials in imperatives
argument does not fit cleanly within the traditional indefinite/definite divisions such
as Fillmore (1969) (though see AnderBois (2012) for a class of ‘flexible’ implicit
arguments in English which come much closer).
(5) Scenario: We are discussing our opinions about a local politician.
Matapat
honest
daw
REP
siya.
DIR.3SG
‘He’s honest, I heard.’ (alt. ‘He’s honest, they say.’) Tagalog
Finally, while reportatives may convey reduced speaker commitment, they are
typically used in ‘veridical’ ways as claimed by Faller (2007)) for Cuzco Quechua
=si, i.e. as though the speaker believes the scope proposition is at least possibly true.
Despite this general tendency, as described in detail across languages by AnderBois
(2014), the scope proposition of REP can – given a perspectivally rich context – be
explicitly denied by the same speaker, as in (6) and (27).
(6) Scenario: We are discussing our opinions about a local politician.
Matapat
honest
daw
REP
siya,
DIR.3SG
pero
but
hindi
NEG
naman
CONTR
iyon
that
totoo.
true
‘He’s honest, they say, but it’s not really true.’ Tagalog
Having shown that the use of Tagalog daw and YM bin in declaratives shares
many core properties with reportatives in other languages, we return now to our
main topic: reportatives in imperative sentences.
3 IMPREP in discourse
Imperatives are a major syntactic sentence type across languages. Although im-
peratives are often associated with directive speech acts like commands, they also
have a range of non-directive functions they readily serve cross-linguistically (see
Aikhenvald (2010), Condoravdi & Lauer (2012) for recent overviews). That is to
say, they are polyfunctional, being usable to perform a wide range of (direct) speech
act functions compared with, say, declarative sentences.
(7) Imperative speech acts:
a. Stand at attention!  COMMAND
b. Please, don’t be rain!  WISH
c. Have a cookie.  OFFER
d. Take the train that leaves in 10 minutes.  ADVICE
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As noted above, one of the limitations of previous discussion on IMPREP is that it
focuses exclusively on the extent to which IMPREP are ‘command-like’, even though
imperative sentences in the first place need not be very command-like. One of our
goals here, then, is to consider IMPREP across a variety of different possible functions
of sort surveyed in (7).
3.1 Illocutionary force of IMPREP in discourse
The IMPERATIVE BY PROXY and NEUTRAL REPORT views present contrasting
characterizations of the type of update encoded by IMPREP. The most direct way
to distinguish between these theories empirically, then, is by seeing what kinds of
speech acts IMPREP perform. While there remains room for inferential processes
that affect the speech act such sentence can be used to perform (e.g. as seen in
imperative polyfunctionality), the two theories nonetheless make clearly distinct
predictions. The IMPERATIVE BY PROXY view, as the name suggests, predicts that
IMPREP should be freely able to be used to perform the same range of speech acts as
other imperatives. The NEUTRAL REPORT view, on the other hand, predicts that
IMPREP should be freely able to be used to perform the same range of speech acts as
declaratives, with any imperative-like uses being instances of indirect speech acts
(or perhaps perlocutionary effects of declarative-like speech acts).
Turning to the data, we find that IMPREP are typically used to perform the same
range of speech acts as imperatives (illustrated here with examples from YM). This
includes command uses as in (8a), but also other uses typically associated with
imperatives, (8b-8d).
(8) a. Order Scenario: Our mother has told me to make sure that my younger
sibling eats their dinner. After talking to her, I tell my sibling:
Uk’
drink.IMPER
bin
REP
a
your
wo’och
meal
k’eyem=o’
pozole-DISTAL
‘Drink your pozole (she orders)!’ Yucatec Maya
b. Advice Scenario: Your stomach hurts and I am on the phone with our
Mom asking for advice. I tell you:
Uk’
drink.IMPER
bin
REP
a
your
wo’och
meal
k’eyem=o’
pozole-DISTAL
‘Drink your pozole (she says)!’ Yucatec Maya
c. Offer Scenario: A child’s mother has told them they should offer cake to
guests. The child says to a guest:
Jaant
eat.IMPER
bin
REP
le
DEF
paastel=a’
cake=DISTAL
‘Eat this cake (Mom told me to offer it)! Yucatec Maya
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d. Well-wish scenario: My friend wants me to tell you to take care. I say to
you:
Kaláant
care.for.IMPER
a
A2
baj
REFL
bin!
REP
‘Take care (s/he says)!’ Yucatec Maya
Beyond positive imperative forms, other related forms similarly are possible and
seemingly retain their characteristic effects as well:
(9) a. Optative: A friend told me to wish you well. I say:
Káa
IRR
xi’ik
go.SUBJ
bin
REP
tech
DAT.B2SG
uts
good
‘May you be well (my friend wishes)!’ Yucatec Maya
b. Exhortative: My friend told us Ko’ox janal! ‘Let’s eat!’. You didn’t hear
what was said and so I repeat for you:
Ko’ox
come.HORT
bin
REP
janal.
eat
‘Let’s eat (she says).’ Yucatec Maya
c. Negative imperative: Juan says he is going to kill one of his father’s pigs.
I am on the phone with Juan’s dad and say:
Ma’
NEG
bin
REP
a
A2
kíinsik
kill
(le
DEF
k’éek’en=o’)!
pig=DISTAL
‘Don’t kill the pig (he says)!’ Yucatec Maya
Conversely, IMPREP are infelicitous in information-seeking contexts such as ones
in which the question under discussion concerns what the speaker heard or what the
speaker wants.3
(10) Xeen
go.IMP
bin
REP
a
A2
maan
buy.SUBJ
bu’ul
bean
‘Go buy beans (I heard).’ Yucatec Maya
a. #Information-seeking scenario: You talked to Mom, what did you hear?
b. #Descriptive bouletic modal scenario: You talked to Mom, what does
Mom want?
3 Constructing these examples is a bit tricky since we need to make sure we have a context where the
corresponding ordinary imperative is not felicitous. This means that certain other deontic modals are
rule out since such imperatives are felicitous even without the reportative:
(i) a. What does my dad think I should do?
b. Go buy beans.
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c.X Order scenario: My mother realized we were out of beans and told my
younger brother to tell me, outside, to go buy some.
In sum, utterances of IMPREP in YM contribute the full range of speech acts
possible with imperatives more generally, but are infelicitous in uses that are most
associated with declaratives, such as making factual claims. This range of uses is
expected under the IMPERATIVE BY PROXY but surprising under the NEUTRAL
REPORT view. This is especially true of the infelicity of IMPREP in information-
seeking contexts, as in (10), since these should be the most readily available uses
under the NEUTRAL REPORT view.
3.2 Responding to IMPREP
In addition to the range of possible speech acts in which IMPREP may be used, further
support for the IMPERATIVE BY PROXY theory comes from the range of possible
responses to IMPREP in discourse. While declarative sentences do not oblige an overt
response, a number of recent works have explored the range of possible responses
to declaratives across languages (e.g. Gunlogson (2001), Farkas & Bruce (2010),
Farkas & Roelofsen (2015)). While declaratives typically do not oblige any overt
linguistic response, one specific conclusion of these works is that responses like
‘yes’ and ‘no’ associated with interrogatives are also possible with declaratives. In
contrast, many of these same responses, such as English ‘yes’, are infelicitous as
responses to imperatives.
Since declarative and imperative updates show different response patterns, we
find again that the two characterizations of IMPREP produce quite different pre-
dictions. If IMPREP contribute neutral reports, they ought to allow for the same
pattern of responses as declaratives do generally. The IMPERATIVE BY PROXY view
predicts that they should allow for the same range of responses as other imperatives,
crucially disallowing responses such as ‘Yes’ and ‘That’s true.’ that are typical for
declaratives.
Turning to the data, IMPREP pattern with other imperatives, therefore support-
ing the IMPERATIVE BY PROXY view. For positive responses as in (11a), typical
responses for declaratives such as jaaj ‘true’ and repeating the first prosodic word of
the verb phrase are infelicitous. Conversely, felicitous responses to positive imper-
atives include simply performing the action in question or replying with ma’alob
túun ‘ok, then’. For negative responses, the simplest response for declaratives, ma’
‘no’ is felicitous, but interpreted as a denial that the speaker will perform the action
rather than a denial that a third party issued an imperative. This is further confirmed
by the asymmetry between responses in (11b) which specifically talk about truth and
those which do not.
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(11) A: Uk’
drink.IMPER
bin
REP
a
your
wo’och
meal
k’eyem=o’
pozole-DISTAL
‘Drink your pozole (she orders)!’ Yucatec Maya
a. B: Ma’alob
okay
túun.
then
// #Jaaj
true
//
drink.IMPER
#Uk’.
‘Okay then.’ // #‘True.’ // #‘Yes.’
b. B: Ma’,
No
(min
NEG.1SG
jantik).
eat
// Mix
NEG
táan.
PROG
// #Ma’
NEG
jaaj=i’.
true=NEG.CL
‘No, (I won’t).’ // ‘I won’t.’ // #‘It’s not true.’
For YM, IMPREP pattern with other imperatives, as expected under the IMPERA-
TIVE BY PROXY view. For Tagalog, however, Schwager (2010) claims that IMPREP
are neutral reports and offers the following as support:
(12) a. K<um>ain
eat<AV>
(ka)
you
daw.
REP
“e.g. ‘Mommy/They/. . . said that you should eat.’ ” Tagalog
b. Hindi
NEG
totoo!
true
‘That’s not true!’
Attempting to replicate this judgment, however, is less than straightforward since
no specific context is provided (as is also suggested by the somewhat schematic
translation). However, I have attempted various concrete contexts which make salient
different sorts of reporters and speakers consistently judge such dialogues marginal
at best. Beyond this specific example, the overall pattern is very much the same
as in YM, with declarative-like responses judged infelicitous: hindi ‘no’, oo ‘yes’,
and other responses relating to truth. Responses typical for imperatives, however,
are plainly acceptable such as sige ‘ok’ (borrowed from Spanish sigue ‘go on’) and
negative desideratives with ayaw.
(13) Order Context: Our mother has told me to make sure that my younger
sibling eats their bread. I tell my sibling:
a. Kainin
eat.PT
mo
INDIR.2SG
daw
REP
ang
DIR
tinapay
bread
mo
your
‘Eat you bread (she orders)!’ Tagalog
b. #Hindi
NEG
(totoo)
true
// Ayaw
not.want
ko
INDIR.1SG
// #Oo
yes
// #Totoo
true
iyan
that
// Sige
okay
(na)
now
(nga)
indeed
# ‘It’s not true.’ // ‘I don’t want to.’ // #‘Yes’ // # ‘That’s true.’ // Okay.
Tagalog
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One nuance of the data worth commenting on is a slight asymmetry between the
positive and negative declarative-like responses. While the positive declarative-like
responses are judged completely out, one speaker for both languages indicated
that the corresponding negative response was not quite as crashingly bad (though
still dispreferred). One possible pragmatic explanation, then, is that the ‘that’s
false’ response implies that the speaker will not perform action since the reporter’s
supposed say-so had been taken to be the motivation behind the IMPREP. In contrast,
the positive ‘that’s true’ response does not make clear whether or not the responder
will perform the action in question in this way. While we regard these declarative
like responses on the whole as being infelicitous, we mention this detail here since it
may help explain the judgment reported in (12) above.
4 Two kinds of weakening with IMPREP
Thus far, we have compared IMPREP with ordinary imperatives in the speech acts they
can be used to perform and the range of felicitous responses they permit. We turn
now to address two kinds of ‘weakening’ effects in IMPREP that have been discussed
informally in prior literature. Empirically, we show that both effects can be found in
YM and Tagalog, but we argue that they are due to specific contextual factors, rather
than being inherent features of IMPREP. Given the crucial role of contextual factors,
we argue in §5.3 that both effects are best analyzed as consequences of more general
pragmatic processes, rather than a direct result of the semantics of IMPREP.
4.1 Weakening of directive force
Aikhenvald (2010: p. 139) claims that reportatives in IMPREP may ‘attenuate’ or
‘soften’ commands, and gives the examples in (14), implying that this possibility
varies by language. While no precise model of imperative semantics is given,
Aikhenvald states that “this is in line with content of a typical imperative-specific
meaning known as ‘degree’ of command”, thus diminishing “the requirement that
the addressee should comply”.
(14) a. Marna-lu
spinifex-3pl
ma-nta
get-IMPER
nganta?
REP
‘Pick up the spinifex, won’t you?’ Warlpiri (Laughren 1982: p. 138)
b. Arrantherre
2PLS
kwele
REP
ntert-irr- /0-aye!
quiet-INCH-IMPER-EMPH
‘You mob are supposed to be quiet.’ Mparntwe Arrernte, (Wilkins 1989:
p. 393)
Taking at face value the claim that the examples in (14) exhibit ‘softening’ of
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the obligation on the addressee, we might well ask whether this effect is a general
feature of IMPREP or a feature of these specific examples. One reason for immediate
skepticism is that these examples both are directive uses and examples of other
sorts with or without ‘softening’ are not available in the sources cited. Although the
notion of ‘softening’ may be intuitive in the case of commands, it is not clear from
Aikhenvald’s description what effect, if any, this ‘softening’ should have in other
sorts of imperative speech acts. Should wishes, curses, warnings, and request uses
similarly be ‘softened’? What does ‘softening’ even mean for offers and disinterested
advice cases, where there is arguably no requirement that the addressee comply to
begin with?
Focusing even just on directive uses, however, we see for YM and Tagalog that
there is no evidence for a specific propensity for ‘softening’ of the sort described.
Rather, the intuitive ‘degree of command’ is impacted by the social and/or rational
authority of the reporter along with that of the speaker (e.g. as discussed by Hamblin
(1987), Kaufmann (2012) among others for ordinary imperatives). While a context
which establishes a reporter with weak social authority intuitively softens the direc-
tive force as in (15a), just the opposite seems to be true in a context where the social
authority of the speaker is strong, (15b). The child uttering (15b) intends to better
ensure that the addressee will apply by appealing to an authority figure with more
control over what the addressee should do. Indefinite or generic reporters as in (15c)
may be likely to lead to ‘weakening’, but this is not a property of the reportative
per se, merely the result of the indirect effect of different reporters’ social/rational
authority.
(15) Uk’
drink.IMPER
bin
REP
a
your
wo’och
meal
k’eyem=o’
pozole-DISTAL
‘Drink your pozole {she orders/he says/they say}!’ Yucatec Maya
a. Weak Social Authority Order Scenario: Our younger brother has told
me to make sure my uncle eats his dinner. After talking to my brother, I
turn to my uncle and say.
b. Strong Social Authority Order Scenario: Our mother has told me to
make sure that my younger sibling eats their dinner. After talking to her, I
tell my sibling.
c. Unspecified Reporter Order Scenario: We are sitting at the table and
you aren’t having your pozole. I say to you.
In sum, while individual utterances of IMPREP may produce an intuitively softer
directive force or ‘degree of command’, there is no evidence that this is a property of
IMPREP per se. Instead, we have seen that to the extent that directive force differs in
IMPREP, it does not become consistently softer, but varies according to more general
pragmatic reasoning about the speaker, addressee, and reporter.
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4.2 Weakening of individual commitment
The second type of ‘weakening’ of IMPREP (versus ordinary imperatives) claimed in
previous literature is the supposed lack of desire on the part of the speaker for the
action in question to be performed (or perhaps lack of a commitment to having such
a desire). This type of weakening is discussed by Thomas (2014), who argues for a
NEUTRAL REPORT approach in part by citing the explicit denial in Mbyá in (16) in
contrast to the ordinary imperative in (17).
(16) E-me’e˜
2.IMPER-give
je
REP
chevy
me
pe
to
ka’ygua,
mate,
va’eri
but
nd-a-ipota-i.
NEG-A1-want-NEG
‘Give me the mate, I heard, but I don’t want it.’ Mbyá
(17) E-me’e˜
2.IMPER-give
ka’ygua
mate
Aureliano
Aureliano
pe,
to,
va’eri
but
nd-a-ipota-i
NEG-A1-want-NEG
re-me’e˜
A2-give
ka’ygua
mate
ichu
him
pe.
to
‘#Give A the mate! But I don’t want you to give him the mate.’ Mbyá
For YM and Tagalog, analogous explicit denials with a negative desiderative
following an IMPREP are also judged more or less felicitous:
(18) a. Jáant
eat.IMPER
bin
REP
a
A2
wo’och=o’,
meal=DISTAL
ba’ale’
but
ten=e’
I=TOP
ma’
NEG
in
A1
k’áat
wish
káa
IRR
a
A2
jáant=i’.
eat=NEG.CL
‘Eat your meal (he says), but me, I don’t want you to eat it.’ Yucatec
Maya
b. ?Tumakbo
run.IMPER
ka
DIR.2SG
daw
REP
araw-araw,
daily
pero
but
ayaw
not.want
kita-ng
DIR2SG.INDIR1SG-LNK
tumakbo.
run
‘Run daily (they say), but I don’t want you to.’ Tagalog
Whether this observation leads us conclude that IMPREP differ in the updates
they encode (i.e. in their meanings), however, depends on one’s theory about what
kind of updates imperatives encode in the first place. Thomas (2014)’s argument
is based on the assumption that such sentences ought to be infelicitous due to their
being logical contradictions. However, there are two potential counterarguments
to this line of reasoning. First, as famously noted by Heim (1992) and illustrated
in (19), the desires/preferences expressed by desiderative verbs like want need not
be mutually consistent with one another. Imperatives, on the other hand, have been
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argued to encode what Condoravdi & Lauer (2012) call EFFECTIVE PREFERENCES,
that is, preference structures where such inconsistencies have been resolved so as to
guide action.
(19) Context: I don’t want to teach at all next semester.
I want to teach Tuesdays and Thursdays next semester. (Heim (1992))
Given this difference between preferences expressed by desideratives and those
expressed by imperatives, we should not expect examples like (18) to be semantically
ill-formed (see Condoravdi & Lauer (2012) for further discussion). Rather, uttering
an imperative typically gives rise to the inference that the speaker wants the addressee
to perform the action described and it is this inference which gives rise to the
contradictory feeling in (17) and its cross-linguistic counterparts.4 The obvious way
to address this concern is to set aside conflicting desideratives and instead consider
conflicting imperatives. For YM and Tagalog, conflicting IMPREP of this sort, as in
(20), are somewhat less felicitous than (18), but not altogether infelicitous.
(20) a. ?Jáant
eat.IMPER
bin
REP
verduras,
vegetables
ba’ale’
but
(t-u
PREP-A3
jaaj-il=e’)
true-REL=TOP
ma’
NEG
a
A2
jantik.
eat
‘They say to eat your vegetables, but (really) don’t.’ Yucatec Maya
b. ?Tumakbo
run.IMPER
ka
DIR.2SG
daw,
REP
pero
but
(dapat)
should
huwag
NEG.IMP
ko-ng
INDIR.2SG-LNK
tumakbo!
run
‘They say to run, but don’t run!’ Tagalog
While these data again confirm that particular utterances of IMPREP may exhibit
‘weakening’ of some sort, here too we argue in §5.3 that this weakening is due
to an independently observed pragmatic process. Specifically, we argue that such
data are analogous to the pattern of denials in declaratives with reportatives that
AnderBois (2014) has dubbed REPORTATIVE EXCEPTIONALITY and attributed to a
more general phenomenon of pragmatic perspective shift.
In this section, we have seen two different kinds of ‘weakening’ found in IMPREP.
While these have been taken as arguments that IMPREP contribute distinct mean-
ings/updates, we have argued that the data are more complicated. Weakening of both
sorts is due to particular aspects of the context and therefore warrants a pragmatic
account instead. We sketch such accounts below in §5.3, but first turn to make a
concrete proposal about the updates we take IMPREP to have in the first place.
4 The situation here is not unlike Moore’s paradoxical sentences in which an inference triggered by the
fact the act of assertion rather than its content produces a contradiction with a subsequent (see also
Frank (1996: p. 84) on related cases with deontic modals). We set aside the question of whether the
two inferences have precisely the same status as one another.
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5 An illocutionary update semantics for IMPREP
Thus far, we have argued that IMPREP, at least in YM and Tagalog, are fundamentally
like other imperatives in terms of how they are used, i.e. constitute IMPERATIVES
BY PROXY. In this section, we sketch an update semantics for IMPREP which fleshes
out the sense in which they are semantically akin to other imperatives: §§5.1-5.2.
Having done this, we return to the two types of weakening from §4, showing how
they can be analyzed as pragmatic reasoning based upon this semantic proposal.
5.1 Declaratives with reportatives in the discourse scoreboard
In order to analyze the updates contributed by IMPREP, we of course need to have
both an understanding of the updates contributed by imperatives as well as how
reportatives modify updates in which they occur. To do this, we briefly review
AnderBois (2014)’s ‘scoreboard’ semantics of reportative evidentials in declarative
sentences in §5.1 before turning to IMPREP themselves in §5.2. We refer the reader
to AnderBois (ms) for a detailed exposition and justification of the ‘scoreboard’
semantics for declaratives and imperative updates assumed here.
For declaratives in general, recent works have argued for one of two different
updates for declarative sentences as in (21) (assuming for simplicity’s sake a con-
versation with two participants, a and b). First, it has been argued that declarative
sentences conventionally encode an individual update that publicly commits a to
having adequate evidence supporting p (Add p to DCa). Second, declarative updates
have been argued to contribute proposals to add p to a and b’s Common Ground
subject to b’s approval (Add p to Table{a,b}).5
(21) a. Input
a Shared {a,b} b
Table{a,b}
DCa CG{a,b} DCb
b. Declarative update (Proposal and Commitment by a)
a Shared {a,b} b
Table{a,b} p
DCa p CG{a,b} DCb
c. Acceptance (by b)
5 Depending on the linguistic means of acceptance by b, p may also be added to DCb. For example,
Gunlogson (2001) argues that an acceptance using English yes achieves this effect, whereas implicit
acceptance moves and some other explicit moves such as ok do not produce this effect.
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a Shared {a,b} b
Table{a,b}
DCa p CG{a,b} p DCb
These two updates have not only different conceptual underpinnings, but different
empirical arguments supporting them as well. For example, Gunlogson (2001) argues
for the public commitment update based on the ways in which rising intonation
modifies the speaker’s commitment (while equally putting the issue of whether p
on the Table for discussion). Conversely, Farkas & Bruce (2010) argue for the
CG proposal update based upon the uniform effect that response particles like yes
and no have across sentence types which differ in their speaker commitments (i.e.
declaratives and interrogatives). We refer the reader to AnderBois (ms) for a more
detailed discussion of empirical and conceptual bases for these two updates.
While often discussed as competing hypotheses about declarative updates, An-
derBois (2014) argues that reportative evidentials show that both updates are needed
and in particular claims that illocutionary reportatives in declaratives like (5) leave
the proposal intact, but alter the public commitment (see also AnderBois (2016)).
This theory, of course, shares much in common with previous illocutionary accounts,
differing principally in that it is specifically DCx which is modified by reportatives
rather than the sincerity conditions of an actual speech act (Faller (2002)) or the CG
itself (Murray (2014)). A declarative with a reportative such as (22) is claimed to
contribute the ‘asymmetric’ update in (23).
(22) Scenario: I am talking on the phone with a friend to ask about the weather
in our town so we can decide whether to bring umbrellas and I tell you:
Táantik
IMM.PAST
bin
REP
u
A3
chuunul
start
u
A3
toosol
sprinkle
ja’=e’
water=TOP
‘It just started to sprinkle (he says).’
(23) Declarative update w/ Reportative bin:
a Shared {a,b} b
Table{a,b} p
DCa REP(p) CG{a,b} DCb
5.2 IMPREP in the discourse scoreboard
While there has often been an impulse to tie imperatives to actions or commands
more directly, as discussed in §4.2 above, many recent works have proposed that
imperatives instead encode preferences of particular kinds. Specifically, we follow
Condoravdi & Lauer (2012) in taking imperatives to express what they call EFFEC-
TIVE PREFERENCES, i.e. preferences where inconsistencies have been resolved so as
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to guide joint action. Given the conceptual similarity with the COMMON GROUND
as well as empirical arguments discussed by AnderBois (ms), we take imperatives to
contribute proposals to update the COMMON PREFERENCES of the conversational
participants: CPref{a,b} (see also Starr (2013), von Fintel & Iatridou (t.a.) for simi-
lar ideas about imperative updates). Specifically, we assume ordinary imperatives
encode proposals to update CPref{a,b} with a preference for the proposition denoted
by the rest of the sentence (typically including a null second-person subject) over its
negation.6
(24) Imperative update (proposal by a):
a Shared {a,b} b
Table{a,b} p > ¬p
DCa CG{a,b} DCb
CPref{a,b}
Above, we followed AnderBois (2014) in taking reportatives in declaratives to
leave the proposal to update the CG unaltered, while committing the speaker only to
REP(p), rather than p itself. Extending this to imperatives, we claim that IMPREP
leave the proposal to update CPref{a,b} unaltered while again adding the information
that a second or third-hand reporter (i.e. someone other than a and b) holds this
preference). We see this semantics illustrated for the IMPREP in (25) in (26).
(25) Order Scenario: Our mother has told me to make sure that my younger
sibling eats their dinner. After talking to her, I tell my sibling:
Uk’
drink.IMPER
bin
REP
a
your
wo’och
meal
k’eyem=o’
pozole-DISTAL
‘Drink your pozole (she orders)!’
(26) Imperative update w/ Reportative bin:
a Shared {a,b} b
Table{a,b} p > ¬p
DCa REP(p > ¬p) CG{a,b} DCb
CPref{a,b}
Returning to the data in §3, the account captures the fact that IMPREP can be
used in the same range of potential speech acts as other imperatives since the same
proposal is made. While we do not provide a concrete analysis of various responses
in YM and Tagalog here, response particles in other languages have been claimed
to make reference to the Table and therefore ought to be uniform between IMPREP
6 Following Villalta (2008)’s work on desideratives, we may well want to take ¬p as a special case of a
more general preference for p over contextually relevant alternatives. We leave it to future work to
determine which view is superior for imperatives.
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and other imperatives. The reportative in this account has no direct effect on the
illocutionary update the IMPREP contributes. As we will see in a moment, however,
the reportative has indirect effects on inferences drawn by the addressee, including
especially the speaker’s personal preference in the matter at hand.
5.3 Two kinds of softening revisited
In §4, we examined two types of weakening found with IMPREP, arguing that both
are due to pragmatic properties of imperatives and reportatives more generally. The
first type of weakening we discussed was the apparent ‘softening’ of directive force
in certain command-like uses. Under the account here, such variability is expected
since the semantics for imperatives already presumes various sorts of pragmatic
reasoning to account for polyfunctionality in the first place (see, e.g. Condoravdi &
Lauer (2012) and Kaufmann (2012)). For the addressee to conclude that the speaker
intends a command, request or other directive use, they will reason about the goals
and the social and/or rational authority of the conversational participants. The same
sort of reasoning applies to IMPREP, merely differing in that the these same features
of the reporter will also enter into the equation. The role of the speaker is not entirely
obviated, however, since a rational speaker will typically not make a proposal that
conflicts with their effective preferences (see AnderBois (2016) for discussion about
the analogous effect in declaratives). While there are many details to be elaborated
upon here, the basic point is that variability in directive force is a feature of ordinary
imperatives and the pragmatic reasoning underlying it plausibly explains similar
variation in IMPREP.
The second type of weakening we found was the ability of the speaker to explic-
itly deny their preference for the imperative proposition, either using a desiderative
or, more marginally, a conflicting imperative. The at least marginal felicity of such
sentences is, on the face of it, unexpected with the semantics proposed above. How-
ever, as illustrated above in (6), this sort of denial has an analogue in declarative
sentences like (27), where the speaker explicitly denies the scope of the reportative.
(27) a. Ma’
NEG
bin
REP
t-in
PFV-A1
máans-(aj)-e
pass-STATUS-DEF
eeksaamen=o’
exam=DISTAL
‘I didn’t pass the exam reportedly, . . . ’
b. ba’ale’
but
t-u
PREP-A3
jaaj-il=e’
true-REL=TOP
t-in
PFV-A1
máans-aj.
pass-STATUS
‘. . . but actually I passed.’ Yucatec Maya
For declarative cases like (27) and their cross-linguistic counterparts, AnderBois
(2014) argues that the felicity of such denials is due to pragmatic perspective shift,
which reportatives facilitate indirectly by making salient an alternative perspective:
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that of the reporter. Beyond the superficial similarity between the two cases of
denials, two more detailed aspects of the data suggest the same dynamic is at play.
First, outside of cases with such explicit denials, we have argued that the same
update to the Table is made (e.g. based on the range of felicitous responses, resultant
speech acts). Second, in both cases, such denials are only felicitous in cases where
other perspectival language highlights the shift in perspective. In IMPREP denials,
these include the use of first person attitude verbs in (18), contrastive elements like
Tagalog pero and YM ba’ale’ in (18-20), and the contrastive use of clausal topics
tene’ ‘as for me’ and tu jaajile’ ‘really’ in (18a) and (18b). Versions of these denials
without such elements (or other similar elements such as special intonation) are
judged infelicitous in comparison to the at least marginally accepted forms. In short,
while researchers may commonly choose to elicit explicit denials, this is not the
typical use of IMPREP (nor of reportatives in declaratives) and their felicity requires
additional contextual, and typically linguistic, support.
6 Conclusions
Recent decades have seen the growth of a vibrant body of research which rigor-
ously examines the contributions of evidentials and their interactions with sentence
type/illocutionary mood. One key source of evidence in investigating this area – and
in particular in the debate between so-called modal versus illocutionary analyses –
has been data regarding evidentials in interrogative sentences. While evidentials in
imperatives are less pervasive across languages and are only attested for reporta-
tives, we hope to have shown that data from imperatives with reportative evidentials
can similarly inform not only the study of evidentials, but also the meanings of
imperatives themselves.
However, while we have argued that reportatives in IMPREP warrant an illo-
cutionary account, we cannot simply conclude that Tagalog daw and YM bin are
illocutionary evidentials. This is because looking beyond IMPREP, we find quite
different properties of the two evidentials in other sentence types. For example,
while Tagalog daw is felicitous in ‘interrogative flip’ scenarios, YM bin is robustly
infelicitous in such uses. Within declaratives, Tagalog daw is embeddable in a wide
range of environments (e.g. as argued by Schwager (2010) and Kierstead (2015)),
while YM bin does not appear to ever be embeddable. Such data, therefore, call into
question the viability of the modal-illocutionary dichotomy (see Korotkova (2016)
for a similar conclusion) or at the very least, suggests that individual evidentials may
have both types of uses.
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